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This article attempts to provide a basis upon which to preserve the Federal Circuit's current lawmaking
primacy. Given the large body of preexisting literature on Chevron, USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, it does not address whether Chevron allocates power between agencies and the courts optimally.
Rather, the article examines how the PTO's statutory interpretations should be reviewed under Chevron. In
Section I, the article places the examination in context by describing the Chevron decision and its general
implications. Section II of the article examines how Chevron should be applied specifically in the context of
reviewing statutory interpretations of the PTO. The article observes that the Federal Circuit has so far avoided
deferring to the PTO by emphasizing Congress' intent as a limitation on the PTO's lawmaking power. Under
Chevron, however, Congress' intent governs only where Congress has expressed itself clearly on the precise
question at issue. The article argues that the PTO is outside the class of Federal agencies to whose statutory
interpretations the judiciary owes deference. The PTO performs few of the traditional functions of Federal
agencies. It is, in fact, structurally isolated from so much of the patent system that the assumptions of agency
expertise responsible for Chevron are inapplicable. There is also evidence that Congress has affirmatively
decided to give lawmaking power in the patent field to the courts and not the PTO. As a result, the article
concludes, the courts need not defer to the PTO's statutory interpretations even in those situations where the
statutory language is ambiguous.
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INTRODUCfION

H

istorically, the relative powers of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and the courts to determine the law of patents
have been unclear. It has been generally assumed that the PTO is
subservient to the courts, and that the PTO must adhere to the law
as the courts determine it to be. 1 The PTO's behavior in this regard
is not uniform, however, and the PTO has occasionally refused to
acquiesce to the decisions of its supervising courts. 2
Recently the PTO has begun to assert that it, and not the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"),
has the primary power to interpret the provisions of Title 35, U.S.C.
The PTO has taken litigation positions in a number of recent cases
which suggest that the Federal Circuit must defer to the PTO's statutory interpretations, provided those interpretations are reasonable
1 E.g., In re Gibbs, 437 F.2d 486, 491 (CCPA 1971) ("[Cllearly this court is not bound by
a ruling of the Commissioner of Patents ... , regardless of how ingrained his ruling may have
become in Patent Office practice.... There is respectable and higher authority contrary to [the]
Commissioner ... to be found in [a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit]."); Geniesse, The Examination System in the U.S. Patent Office, at 35, Patent
Study No. 29 of the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States Sen., 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (reports in this set are hereinafter
referred to individually as "Patent Study No. _ _ ") ("[D]ecisions of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals ... generally are controlling with respect to the Office. ").
2 For example, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held, in In re Bowers, 359 F.2d 866
(1966), that common assignees could use terminal disclaimers to address double-patenting rejections between applications filed by different inventive entities. The PTO subsequently issued a
Notice stating that it would not adopt that practice. Notice: Double Patenting (Comm'r. Pat. Jan.
9, 1967), reprinted at 834 O.G. 1615 (Jan. 31, 1967). It later abandoned that practice and
conformed to court precedents. See Notice: Initial Guidelines Implementing Changes in 35 U. S. C.
§§ 103, 116, and 120, (Comm'r. Pat. Dec. 11, 1984), reprinted at 1050 O.G. 316 (Jan. 8,
1985); Notice of Final Rulemaking: Final Rules for Miscellaneous Patent Provisions, 50 Fed.
Reg. 9368 (1985).
More recently, the PTO has promulgated a new set of rules defining the applicant's duty to
disclose information to the PTO during prosecution. PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking - Duty of
Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (hereinafter "PTO Notice Regarding Duty of
Disclosure"). See infra, note 146. Certain provisions of the rules are specifically designed to
overturn common-law precedents of th~ United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
See generally, Moy, The Effect of New Rule 56 on Inequitable Conduct Detenninations in the
Courts, 74 JPTOS 257 (April 1?92) (hereinafter "The Effect of New Rule 56").
The PTO has recently refused to acquiesce to the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the sixth
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 in patentability determinations. Directive to the Examining Corps
(Comm'r. Pat. Dec. 3, 1990), reprinted at 41 PTCJ 411-12 (Mar. 14, 1991) (stating decision
not to follow In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990» (hereinafter "PTO Notice Regarding
Section 112"). See infra, at notes 61, 147-57.
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and not contrary to the intent of Congress. 3 The PTO has also justified
on the same grounds its refusal to adopt a statutory interpretation of
the Federal Circuit. 4
The PTO is thus asserting that its statutory interpretations are
entitled to judicial deference similar to that given the interpretory
rulings of other Federal agencies. 5 In so doing, it has relied on a
controversial recent decision of the United States Supreme Court,
Chevron~ U.S.A.~ Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 6 The
Chevron decision has been the subject of numerous articles in the
field of Administrative Law. 7 Prominent authors on both sides of the
debate suggest that Chevron is capable of fundamentally reallocating
lawmaking power away from the courts and to Federal agencies. 8
The PTO's assertion thus touches upon the basic arrangement
of the patent system. If the PTO's statutory interpretations are entitled
to Chevron deference the primary source for much of patent law will
be the PTO and not the Federal Circuit. Preserving the current primacy of the Federal Circuit, however, requires fitting the relative
powers of the PTO and the Federal Circuit within the Supreme Court's
analysis in Chevron.
This article attempts to provide a basis upon which to preserve
the Federal Circuit's current lawmaking primacy. Given the large
body of preexisting literature on Chevron, it does not address whether
Chevron allocates power between agencies and the courts optimally.
3 Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (construction of 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-.07 in
relation to stays of reexamination proceedings); Glaxo Operations U.K. Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d
392, 398 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (interpretation of "product" in 35 U.S.C. § 156(a»; HoecllSt v.
Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (35 U.S.C. § 156).
4 PTO Notice Regarding Section 112, 41 PTa 411. See infra, at notes 61, 147-57.
5 E.g., Notice: Applicability of the last paragraph of 35 U. S. C. § 112 to patentability determinations before the Patent and Trademark Office (Comm'r. Pat. Dec. 13, 1991), reprinted at
43 PTa 161, 164 (Dec. 19, 1991) (hereinafter "PTO Explanatory Notice").
6 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See e.g., Glaxo v. Quigg, 894 F.2d at 398; PTO Explanatory Notice,
43 PTa at 164.
7 E.g., Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363
(1986) (hereinafter "Breyer"); Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes; An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 Admin. L.J. 255 (1988); Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Column. L. Rev. 452 (1989)
(hereinafter "Farina"); Mikva, How Should Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, printed in
36 Am. U.L. Rev. (1986) (hereinafter "Mikva"); Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 301 (1988) (hereinafter "Pierce"); Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 283 (1986)
(hereinafter "Starr"); Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L.J. 511 (hereinafter "Scalia"); Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990) (hereinafter "Sunstein").
8 See e.g., Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 464-67, and Scalia, 1989 Duke L.J. at 512-13.
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Rather, the article examines how the PTa's statutory interpretations
should be reviewed under Chevron. 9 In Section I, the article places
the examination in context by describing the Chevron decision and
its general implications. Section II of the article examines how Chevron should be applied specifically in the context of reviewing statutory interpretations of the PTa.
The article observes that the Federal Circuit has so far avoided
deferring to the PTO by emphasizing Congress' intent as a limitation
on the PTa's lawmaking power. Under Chevron, however, Congress'
intent governs only where Congress has expressed itself clearly on
the precise question at issue. In reality Congress acts with such clarity
only rarely. The Federal Circuit's current manner of dealing with
Chevron therefore does not really justify the lack of deference that
the court is according the PTa.
The article argues instead that the PTO is outside the class of
Federal agencies to whose statutory interpretations the judiciary owes
deference. The PTO performs few of the traditional functions of
Federal agencies. It is, in fact, structurally isolated from so much of
the patent system that the assumptions of agency expertise responsible
for Chevron are inapplicable. There is also evidence that Congress
has affirmatively decided to give lawmaking power in the patent field
to the courts and not the PTO. As a result, the article concludes, the
courts need not defer to the PTO's statutory interpretations even in
those situations where the statutory language is ambiguous.
9 This, of course, is more limited than addressing judicial review of the PTO's legal deter·
minations generally. Unlike many areas of Federal law, large portions of the law of patents are
controlled by case law rather than statutory provisions. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent
Act, at 2, reprinted in 35 U.S.C.A. (1954 ed.). Chevron deals with agency interpretations of
statutes, and therefore does not apply directly to agency interpretations of case law.
Nor does Chevron provide a ready analogy to the proper review of case law interpretations.
The more startling implications of Chevron result from assumptions concerning Congress' intent
with regard to the statutory provision at issue, which binds the courts under the theory of sepa·
ration-of·powers. See infra, at notes 30·32. When a court reviews an agency interpretation of
case law, however, the court itself has the basic lawmaking authority. The court's power to
disagree. with the agency without deference in such a situation is therefore clear.
Practically, this means Chevron should provide little or no reason to defer to the PTO's law·
making efforts in areas controlled by common law, such as inequitable conduct and the duty to
disclose. See generally The Effect of New Rule 56, 74 JPTOS 257. The present article, however,
does not address this latter point in detail.
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1. CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC. V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL

A. The Chevron Decision and Its Rationale.

Chevron addressed an interpretation of the Clean Air Act lO by
the Environmental Protection Agency. Under that Act, certain states
were required to establish permit programs for "new or modified
stationary sources" of air pollutionY The Act did not permit any
such sources in the particular states unless certain stringent requirements were met.
The plaintiff in Chevron was an environmental-interest group
that sought to have the EPA apply the Clean Air Act aggressively.
It argued that "source" meant any individual pollution-generating
piece of equipment. Thus under its statutory interpretation persons
were required to obtain permits before changing any aspect of an
operation that generated air pollution.
The Environmental Protection Agency, in contrast, had issued
regulations interpreting "source" as any a single industrial plant.
Under the agency's interpretation the owner of a plant that contained
several individual pollution-generating pieces of equipment could add
a new piece of equipment, or increase the pollution generated by an
old piece of equipment, and yet still escape regulation if another piece
of equipment in the same plant was modified to reduce its pollution
by at least a corresponding amount. 12 The EPA's interpretation therefore would have led to many fewer instances of regulation.
The interest group sought review of the EPA's interpretory regulation before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 13 That court held that the Act "does not explicitly define
what Congress envisioned as a 'stationary source . . . . ' "14 It further found the legislative history "at best contradictory."1s Faced
with this lack of Congressional direction, the court looked to its own
precedents and its sense of the Act's purpose to hold that the environmental group's interpretation was correct. 16
10 As amended in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
11 Section 172(b) (6), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6).
12 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
13 National Resources Defense Counci~ Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 178 (D.C. CiT. 1982).
14 467 U.S. at 723.
15 Id. at 726 n.39.
16Id. at 725-28.
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The Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court and held
that the EPA's interpretation should control. When determining the
meaning of statutory language, it held, the courts are subservient to
Congress. As a first step, therefore, "[i]f the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."17If, however, "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue," the court in a second step must "determine ... whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. "18 As a result, the reviewing court cannot
"simply impose its own construction of the statute. "19
In the precise case before it, the Court found the statutory language unclear and the legislative history "unilluminating. "20 On that
basis it agreed that "Congress did not have a specific intention" on
the meaning of "stationary source. "21 The question, therefore, was
how to fill a "gap" in the statutory provision "left open by Congress."22
According to the Supreme Court this task of gap-filling is primarily a function for the agency and not the reviewing court. "The
court may not substitute its own construction for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."23 To uphold the
agency's construction, therefore, "the court need not conclude that
the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted . . . , or even the reading that the court would have reached
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.' '24
The Supreme Court thus accused the court of appeals of "misperceiv[ing] the nature of its role."25 An ambiguous statutory provision may permit a number of different, but still reasonable
interpretations. If the agency's interpretation is one of these reasonable alternatives its judgment is controlling and should be affirmed. 26
17 Id. at 842-43.
18 Id. at 843.
19 Id. at 843. See generally Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statutory
Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 Duke L.J.
469.
20 467 U.S. 859-62.
21 Id. at 845.
22 Id. at 866.
23 Id. at 844.
24 Id. at 843 n.ll.
25 Id. at 845.
261d. at 845.
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The Court found the EPA's interpretation of "stationary source" to
be one such reasonable alternative. It therefore reversed the court of
appeals and upheld the Agency. 27
Despite the apparent directness of the language in Chevron, the
exact rationale behind the holding in that case has been the subject
of speculation. 28 Prior to Chevron the judiciary deferred to agency
interpretations on the view that an agency is simply more likely than
a reviewing court to correctly interpret the agency's regulatory statute. Under this analysis the courts had the power to substitute their
own interpretory views for those of the agency freely. In the individual cases where they did not use this power they were thought to
be acting out of voluntary deference to the greater expertise of the
agency.29
The most widely accepted analysis30 asserts that Chevron, in
contrast, is the result of the doctrine of separation-of-powers. 31 The
controlling factor in this analysis is Congress' choice of which institution should have law-interpreting power over a given statute. Chevron, it is said, holds that Congress should ordinarily be presumed to
have assigned the task of interpreting the law to the agency and not
the courts. The deference shown by the courts under Chevron is
therefore involuntary, in that the courts are constrained to follow the
will of Congress. 32
B. The General Significance of Chevron.

Chevron is part of an ongoing, fundamental debate in administrative law. 33 Federal agencies are part of the executive branch. Under
27 Id. at 865·67.
28 E.g., Scalia, 1989 Duke L.J. 511; Sunstein, 1990 Duke L.J. at 2075-76.
29 See, e.g., Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 453-54; Scalia, 1989 Duke L.J. at 514. The leading
case during this period was Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). According to that decision,
(t)he weight of (the Agency's) judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.

30 Commentators have also brought forward an analysis under which the result in Chevron is
constitutionally compelled. Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 499; Scalia, 1989 Duke L.J. at 514515. That analysis, however, has generally been deemed insubstantial. E.g., Scalia, 1989 Duke
L.J. at 515-16. It is not discussed further in this article.
31 E.g., Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 166-67; Scalia, 1989 Duke L.J. at 516-17.
32 Some commentators have used the terms "deferential model" and "independent judgment
model," respectively, to refer to the approach of Chevron and that of the cases which preceded
it. E.g., Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 454 n.10 (citing examples).
33 Professor Farina outlines the history of this debate. 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 452-54. See, e.g.,
Pittstone Stevedoring Corp. v. Del/aventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976).
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traditional separation-of-powers doctrine, that branch only has the
power to enforce the law; it cannot make or interpret the law. Congress, nevertheless, commonly delegates to agencies the power to
promulgate binding legal rules. 34 Simultaneously, agencies routinely
interpret both statutory and regulatory provisions. As a result, agencies combine aspects of all three constitutional powers in a single
entity-a situation that has been described as "radically reconfigur[ing] the pattern of government authority."35 For these reasons,
agencies have been described as having an "awkward" constitutional
basis. 36
At the same time, choosing between possible statutory interpretations inevitably entails making and implementing policy judgments.37 Agencies, proponents of Chevron say, are inherently bettersuited to perform this task than are the courts. Agencies are both
democratically accountable to the electorate38 and more likely to be
expert with regard to the workings of the statutory provisions.
The debate surrounding Chevron thus concerns how lawmaking
power should be allocated between agencies and the courtS.39 Giving
interpretive power to the judiciary provides some measure of independent control over the agency. Arguably, over time this will check
the agency from engaging in actions that are too sweeping. 40 If read
broadly, however, Chevron describes a rule of deference that shifts
nearly all the interpretive power surrounding regulatory statutes to
34 The courts at first had difficulty accepting this seemingly anomalous transfer of constitutional
power from one branch of government to another, initially rejecting it entirely under what became
known as the "Nondelegation Doctrine." See generally 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,
§§ 3.01 et seq. (2d ed. 1978); Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 478-488.
35 Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 497. Farina discusses the relationship of administrative
lawmaking to the constitutional system of separation-of-powers in detail, id. at 488-99. See also
Sunstein, 1990 Duke L.J. at 2075.
36 Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State, 143 (1990) (hereinafter "Rights Revolution "). See also Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 456 (describing "constitutional unease in allocating power in the administrative state").
37 See, e.g., Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 466 ("The process of statutory interpretation
inevitably involves some lawmaking, as well as law finding, component."); Scalia, 1989 Duke
L.J. at 517-19, Sunstein, 1990 Duke L.J. at 2086 (describing the choice of possible statutory
interpretations as "call[ing] for [) frankly value-laden judgments").
38 See, e.g., Farina, 89 Column. L. Rev. at 466; Scalia, 1989 Duke L.I. at 517-19; Seidenfeld,
A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1550-54
(forthcoming 1992) (hereinafter "Seidenfeld"); Starr, 3 Yale I. on Reg. at 308, 312.
39 See, e.g., Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 464.
40 See, e.g., Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 1989 Duke L.I. 522, 527-29 (1989).
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the agency itself. 41 This, it is argued, is the conceptual equivalent of
having "foxes ... guard henhouses. "42
The wide-ranging importance of these topics has created spirited
debate over the proper reading of Chevron. The debate has generated
a large body of literature, to which the leading scholars in the field
of Administrative Law have contributed. 43 Generally speaking, an
expansive reading is favored by those who have substantial faith in
the political accountability of agencies. 44 Those who consider political control over agencies to be ineffective, or who value the traditional law-interpreting function of the courts more highly, tend to
favor a narrow reading. 45 The debate is currently unsettled. 46
C. The Potential Impact of Chevron Deference on Judicial Review of the PTO's
Statutory Interpretations.

To give the PTO's statutory interpretations Chevron deference
would work a fundamental and wide-ranging change in the relationship of that agency to the Federal Circuit. Neither the Federal Circuit
nor its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have
been particularly deferential to the PTO on matters of law. 47 Chevron
41 Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 462 (asserting that the deference principle of Chevron is
capable of "extremism"; "In the world according to Chevron, the judiciary's role in interpreting
regulatory statutes amounts to little more than serving as a mouthpiece for legislative directives
that are unequivocal and directly on point. Whenever such a communication cannot be conveyed,
the court must step aside to free the agency (within the modest constraints of making a rational
choice) to resolve what its statute shall mean .... " (omitting footnotes)).
42 Rights Revolution at 224.
43 See, e.g., the sources collected supra, at note 7.
44 See, e.g., Pierce, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 301; Scalia, 1989 Duke L.J. 511; Starr, 3 Yale J. on
Reg. 283. Professor Farina describes Justice Scalia as a "determined proponent of Chevron and
the deferential model." 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 455. See Note, Deference to Discretion: Scalia's
Impact on Judicial Review of Agency Action in an Era of Deregulation, 38 Hastings L.J. 1223
(1987).
45 See Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change and the
Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 1101 (1988); Breyer, 38 Admin L.
Rev. at 372-82; Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452; Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA:
Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 Va. L. Rev. 271, 287-92 (1986).
46 Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 457 n.21. Some scholars have asserted that even Justice
Stevens, who wrote Chevron, appears to favor a narrow reading of the decision. These assertions
are based on Justice Stevens' statements in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48
(1987) (appearing to limit Chevron deference to agency determinations of mixed questions of law
and fact). E.g., Sunstein, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 2076; Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking
Judicial Control of Bureaucracy (1990). See generally Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 460 n.42.
47 E.g., In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (refusing to limit review of
decisions of the PrO Board of Appeals to search for rational basis; "Board determinations . . .
may be in error even if there is a rational basis therefore. "); In re DeBlauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 703
(obviousness, as legal question, reviewed for "correctness or error as a matter of law"); In re
Gibbs, 437 F.2d at 491.

HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 414 1992

June 1992

PTO's Interpretations of the Patent Law

415

deference, however, would make the PTO the entity primarily responsible for announcing the patent law in many areas. The Federal
Circuit's role in those areas would be limited to constraining the PTO
only on those comparatively rare occasions when the PTO interpretation under review could be said to be unreasonable or contrary to
the clear meaning of the statute.
The Federal Circuit's decision of Paulik v. Rizkalla 48 illustrates
this potential impact of Chevron on the law relating to patents. Paulik
dealt with whether a patent applicant could establish priority in an
interference by relying on renewed activity after abandonment,
suppression, or concealment. It was an in banc decision in which the
court split 7-5, the majority holding the priority could be based on
such renewed activity.
If the PTO is entitled to Chevron deference, the outcome and
rationale in Paulik should have been vastly different. The precise
issue in Paulik was the proper interpretation of Section 102(g).49
which sets out the rule of priority in interferences. The statute was
unclear, however, in that it failed to define the terms "abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed." In Paulik the PTO, through its Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences, had interpreted that statutory provision in the decision under review to preclude relying on renewed
activity. "50
Under Chevron, therefore, the Federal Circuit should not have
been concerned with which interpretation it felt to be best. Instead,
the issue should have been whether the PTO's interpretation was
reasonable in light of the statutory language. The PTO's interpretation
almost certainly was reasonable, given that five judges of the Federal
Circuit felt it was correct.
Deciding Paulik under Chevron thus would have resulted in the
Federal Circuit affirming, rather than reversing, the PTO. Had that
48 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
4935 U.S.C. § 102(g). The provision reads as follows:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only
the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence
of one who was fITSt to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.

50 760 F .2d at 1271-72. Chevron deference applies to statutory interpretations made by adjudication as well as by rule. E.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens
and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. of Reg. 1,47-49 (1990) (hereinafter "Anthony").
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occurred the present legal rule in this area would not reflect the
considered judgment of the Federal Circuit. The rule would instead
be that determined in the PTO.
This type of analysis will become commonplace if Chevron is
held to apply to the PTO's statutory interpretations. 51 At its broadest,
Chevron would vest the primary power to announce the statutory law
of patents in the PTO and not the Federal Circuit. The PTO has never
had that power before to any significant degree. 52 The precise impacts
of such a change on the substantive law of patents are therefore very
hard to predict. They may not be to the liking of either the patent
bar or the courts.
D. Chevron's Impact to Date on the Federal Circuit's Review of the PTO.

Chevron's analysis places heavy emphasis on whether Congress
has exhibited a "clear" intent with regard to the substantive legal
question at issue. Congress' clear intent binds the agency. Where
such an intent exists the issue of judicial deference to the agency's
interpretation does not arise. 53
In fact, however, the stakes associated with this first step of
Chevron's analysis are much higher. Requiring an agency's statutory
interpretations to be reasonable is at best a "modest constraint. "54 A
court faced with applying Chevron deference thus usually will only
be able to overturn the agency's interpretation upon finding Congress'
instructions on the matter to be clear. A court that wishes to overturn
an agency's interpretation may therefore stretch to find clarity where
the provision is actually unclear. 55
The Federal Circuit's post-Chevron reviews of the PTO seem to
illustrate this phenomenon. The Federal Circuit has confronted Chevron's impact on its review of the PTO's patent-law decisions in three
51 The Federal Circuit has already deferred under Chevron to agencies other than the PTO.
E.g., Pine Products v. U.S., 945 F.2d 1555 (1991) (U.S. Forrest SeIVice); Davis v. OPM, 938
F.2d 1283 (1991); PPG Industries v. U.S., 928 F.2d 1568 (1991) (ITC); Generra Sportswear
Co. v. United States, 905 F.2d 377 (1990) (U.S. Customs SeIVice).
52 See, e.g., the authorities collected supra, at note 47. See also Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S.
694, 717·18 (1888) and Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33·34 (1895), discussed
infra, at notes 175·89.
53 See supra, note 17.
54 Farina, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 463.
55 Seidenfeld, 105 HaIV. L. Rev. at 1548 (citing examples). Professor Sunstein has obselVed
this trend in post·Chevron decisions of the Supreme Court. Sunstein, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 208485 n.68.
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published opinions to date. 56 In each case it has relied upon supposedly clear congressional intent to overturn the PTO. Several of these
cases, however, have presented substantial reasons to characterize
Congress' instructions as unclear. 57 It is possible, then, to describe
the Federal Circuit as resistant to giving the PTO Chevron deference,
yet searching for a proper doctrinal basis upon which to reach that
result. 58
The PTO is evidently aware that its attempts to make use of
Chevron are meeting this'resistance. In a recent Notice defending its
interpretation of the last paragraph of Section 112,59 the PTO has
argued extensively about both the language of that statutory provision
and the underlying congressional intent. 60 The PTO thus appears to
56 Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d at 1426 (statutory provision contained "no ambiguity,"
Congressional intent apparent from legislative history); Glaxo v. Quigg, 894 F.2d at 395 ("plain
meaning" of statutory language clear); Hoechst v. QUigg, 917 F.2d at 529 (interpretation controlled by "plain meaning of the statute and the relevant legislative history").
57 Hoechst v. Quigg, for exampe, concerned the proper construction of 35 U.S.C. § 156. That
section extends the term of patents covering products that have been "subject to a regulatory
review period before [their] commercial marketing or use." The section further defines "regulatory review period" to be a defined period "to which the limitation described in paragraph (6)
applies." Id. at § 156(g) (6). At issue was the precise meaning of this latter phrase. The PTO
interpreted the phrase literally, so that if the limitation of paragraph (6) did not apply, no regulatory
review period existed. The Federal Circuit admitted that its own interpretation created a "windfall" for the patent applicant "that was probably not contemplated by Congress." 917 F.2d at
529. See also Glaxo v. Quigg, 894 F.2d at 397-98 (discussing PTO's reliance on legislative
history of 35 U.S.C. § 156(a».
58 But cf. In re Dr. Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1987), in which the Federal Circuit
reviewed the PTO's interpretation of the term "service" in Sections 3 and 45 of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1127 (1982). In Dr. Pepper, the court in one passage seemed to adopt
a Chevron-style deference to the PTO with regard to interpretations of trademark-registration
provisions.
While the interpretations of the statute by the board [TIAB] are not binding on this court, under general principles
of administrative law, deference should be given by a court to the agency charged with its administration ....
. We conclude that the board reasonably (interpreted the statute.]

Id. at 510. The Federal Circuit cited United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 F.2d
121, 131 (1985) in support of this passage. Riverside is a post-Chevron decision of the Supreme
Court that reiterates the deferential rule announced in Chevron.
Obviously, Dr. Pepper involved the PTO's relationship to the Lanham Act. It does not address
the effect of the PTO's different relationship to the patent statutes. In addition, however, there
are reasons to believe the court in Dr. Pepper did not mean to lay down a strict rule of deference
to the PTO in matters concerning trademark registrability. In the same opinion the court emphasized that its own prior precedents had addressed the issue and required a particular interpretation.
Id. at 510-11. The Federal Circuit has also declined to restate the deferential aspects of Dr. Pepper
broadly. See In re Budge Manufacturing Co., 857 F.2d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
59 U,S.C. § 112, ~ 6. The provision is quoted in full, infra, in the text accompanying note
147.
60 PTO Explanatory Notice, 43 PTCJ at 162-65 (addressing plain meaning of statutory language
and effect of Congressional reenactments). See the discussion infra, at notes 147-157.
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be focusing greater energy on contesting the "clear" meaning of the
statutory provision under interpretation. 61
II. Is THE PTO ENTITLED TO CHEVRON DEFERENCE?
The Federal Circuit's reliance on clear congressional intent appears to be based on a perception that, in cases of ambiguity, Chevron
inexorably favors an agency's interpretation over that of the courts.
This perception is not correct, however. Not every statutory interpretation that a federal agency makes is entitled to Chevron deference. 62 Chevron speaks of deferring to "an agency's construction of
the statute which it administers. "63 Later decisions repeat this limitation routinely.64 Thus, "legal position taken ... with respect to
61 The PTO's arguments, in fact, evince a straining for congressional clarity roughly similar
to what Professors Sunstein and Seidenfeld have observed in the behavior of the courts, supra,
note 55. For example, the PTO attempts make much in its Explanatory Notice about Congress'
use of the words "cover" and "construe" in Section 112. It asserts that the Supreme Court has
used these words only in the context of validity and infringement issues, not patentability determinations. 43 PTCJ at 164-65. This, the PTO continues, indicates that Congress intended for the
provision not to apply to matters of patentability. Id.
In fact, however, other court decisions indicate that the words "construe" and "cover" were
used commonly to refer to patentability matters when the statutory provision under consideration
was written in 1952. E.g., In re Kinney, 168 F.2d 756,757 (CCPA 1948); In re Davis, 164 F.2d
626, 628 (CCPA 1947); In re Flint, 150 F.2d 126, 131-32 (CCPA 1945). The PTO was using
these terms itself in administrative adjudications. E.g., In re Frey, 182 F.2d 184, 186 (CCPA
1950) (quoting decision of the Patent Office). The PTO's use of 'the statutory terms in fact may
be more probative than that of the Supreme Court, since the principal author of the statutory
language, Pasquale J. Federico, was himself an Examiner-in-Chief of the PTO at the time. PTa
Explanatory Notice, 43 PTCJ at 161; See generally, Rich, Congressional Intent-Or, Who Wrote
the Patent Act of I952?, reprinted in Witherspoon, Nonobviousness: the Ultimate Condition of
Patentability, 1:1 (1978) (hereinafter "Congressional Intent").
62 E.g., Adams Fruit CO. Y. Barrett, _ _ U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 1390-91 (1990),
discussed infra at notes 86-95.
63 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).
64 E.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, _ _ U.S.
, 60 U.S.L.W. 4145, 4147 (1992);
Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Wagner Seed CO. Y. Bush, 946 F.2d 918,
920 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. Y. Legal Services Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 689
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Laforte v. Homer, 833 F.2d 977 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Pine Products Corp. v.
United States, 945 U.S. 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (deferring interpretation of the U.S. Forrest
Service). Some decisions express the same concept through the verb "to implement" or other
equivalent language. E.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. Y. United States, 896 F.2d 574, 578 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Brotherhood of Railway Cannen Y. ICC, 880 F.2d 562, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1989);Ayuda,
Inc. Y. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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matters that are not committed to the agency's administration do not
qualify for Chevron treatment. "65
When, then, can an agency be said to administer the statute it
is construing and as a result qualify for the judicial deference described in Chevron? More specifically, does the PTO qualify for
Chevron deference when it is construing the patent statute?
The resolution of this question is a matter of some importance.
If the PTO is not entitled to Chevron deference, the Federal Circuit
will have available a different, alternate ground' upon which to reject
the PTO's statutory interpretations. Concluding that the PTO is not
entitled to deference, however, will also have a much wider significance: the PTO's opinions on statutory interpretation will never be
controlling. Released from Chevron, the Federal Circuit will be free
to defer to the PTO with regard to ambiguous provisions only as the
court sees fit. 66 Where clear statutory provisions are at issue, Congress' instructions will bind both the Federal Circuit and the PTO.67
As a further benefit, if the Federal Circuit is in fact reluctant to defer
to the PTO as a general matter, expressly refusing the PTO Chevron
deference will cause the Federal Circuit's opinions to more accurately
reflect the rationale that the court is actually using.
A. The Entitlement to Chevron Deference Generally
1. Chevron as evolution

Chevron's relationship to the law that preceded it suggests the
proper inquiry for determining whether an agency can be said to
administer a particular statute. The Supreme Court has elaborated on
Chevron by stating the "historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the presumption that Congress
delegates interpretive lawmaking poewr to the agency rather than the
reviewing court . . . "68 These same two considerations have always
65 Scalia, 1989 Duke L.I. at 519. See Crandon v. United States, _ _ U.S.
, 110
S.Ct. 997, 1011 (1990) (Scalia, I., concurring in jUdgment) (rejecting Chevron deference where
the statute "is not administered by any agency but by the courts"); Sunstein, 90 Colum. L. Rev
at 2091, 2094 (Chevron inapplicable where agency has no "implementing" authority; "If agencies are simply interpreting a statute, but have not been granted the power to 'administer' it, the
principle of deference should not apply."). See also Adams Fruit v. Barrett, 110 S.Ct. at 1390
(" A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative
authority."); Tucson Medical Center v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 971, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
66 See the text supra accompanying notes 28-29.
67 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. See supra, note 17.
68 Martin v. Occ. Safety & Health Reg. Comm'n., _ _ U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 1171
(1991).
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been important to courts in deciding whether to defer to an agency's
statutory interpretations. 69 What is different from prior precedents is
that Chevron does not involve significantly evaluating the wisdom of
the particular interpretation at issue. This is a marked change from
the past, when extensive evaluation of the particular interpretation
was the norm. 70
Chevron can thus be viewed as requiring courts to adjust how
they review the statutory interpretations of agencies. Factors specific
to the wisdom of the particular interpretation at issue are to be deemphasized. They are now relevant only to the extent that the agency's interpretation can be called unreasonable. In contrast, systematic
factors-those factors that go to whether the agency is expert in the
field generally-are to be given greater importance. These systematic
factors can actually be so persuasive as to create a presumption that
Congress has delegated interpretive lawmaking power to the agency.
Chevron, in fact, implies that they are sufficient to create such a
presumption in the usual case.
Whether an agency administers a statute for purposes of Chevron
therefore depends on whether these systematic factors show the agency
to be expert. Where the systematic factors strongly favor the agency,
the courts should give the agency's statutory interpretations Chevron
deference. Conversely, where the systematic factors are weak Chev69 Professor Farina, for example, has synthesized the factors that affected judicial deference
in the pre·Chevron era. 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 454 n.8. She discerns groupings that include the
following:
(1) factors affecting the likelihood that the agency knows what Congress intended the statute to mean (e.g.,
whether the agency participated in the drafting of the statute; whether its position was adopted at, or shortly
after, the time the statute was enacted; whether the agency's position was clearly articulated at a time when
Congress reentered the area without expressing disapprova1); [and)
(2) factors affecting the likelihood that the agency knows which interpretation will best further the statutory
purpose (e.g., whether the question is within the agency's area of expertise; whether the question is a fairly
technical one; whether the agency has amassed experience in the area) [.)

Id. Cf. Saunders, Interpretive Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for
Public Participation, 1986 Duke L.J. 346, 350 (asserting that pre-Chevron factors responsible
for judicial deference have been spelled out, but how the degree of deference relates to the
presence, or salience of factors remains unclear); Anthony, 7 Yale J. on Reg. at 6·7, 15.
These two groupings of factors are strikingly similar to the Supreme Court's recent explanation
of Chevron.
70 E.g., Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. at 140, discussed supra at notes 28-29. Farina describes
this grouping as
(3) factors going to the agency's inherent "credibility" as an expert (e.g., the thoroughness and attention with
which the agency's position was formulated; whether the agency has changed its views over time; whether the
agency position seems consistent and plausible, both internally and when viewed in light of its position on other
issues).

89 Colum. L. Rev. at 454 n.8.
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ron deference should not apply. Thus where the agency is at a "comparative disadvantage" relative to the courts in determining the correct
statutory interpretation, Chevron deference should not exist. 71
2. Entitlement in light of the traditional functions of agencies.

The strength of these systematic factors in an individual case is
closely tied to the degree to which the agency performs traditional
agency functions. Administrative Law describes the major traditional
functions of agencies as rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication. 72
Agencies with all three powers are described as "unitary."73 Unitary
agencies include the EPA, 74 the Federal Trade Commission,75 the
Securities Exchange Commission,76 and the Federal Communications
Commission. 77
Thus, for example, the EPA has been entrusted with the task of
promulgating standards via rulemaking under various statutes. 78 In
addition, the EPA maintains an extensive network of enforcement
personnel throughout its home office and ten regional offices,79 whose
functions include monitoring whether regulated persons are acting in
compliance with the agency's promulgated standards. 80 Although a
number of statutes for which the EPA is responsible call for the EPA
71 Sunstein, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 209l.
72 E.g., Donovan v. Amorello, 761 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.) (describing the
"three traditional administrative powers" as "legislative (rulemaking), prosecutorial, and adjudicative"); See generally, e.g., Asimow, The Curtain Falls: Separation of Function in the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 759 (1981) (hereinafter "Asimow").
73 Martin v. Occ. Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n., _ _ U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 1176
(1991).
74 Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1343
(1988).
75 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s-77u.
77 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
78 These include the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, §§ 107, 202, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, §§ 4, 6, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat.
2003, and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, § 1412(a), Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660.
As to the structure and operation of the EPA, see generally, e.g., National Research Council,
Decision Making in the Environmental Protection Agency, 2 Analytical Studies for the Environmental Protection Agency (1977) (hereinafter "National Research Council Study''); Quarles,
Cleaning Up America; An Insider's View of the Environmental Protection Agency (1976); Landy,
The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions (1990) (hereinafter "The
EPA").
79 The National Research Council estimated the EPA as employing 2,000 enforcement personnel in 1977. National Research Council Study at 186.
80 The EPA has, for example, the power to force any person who has handled hazardous
wastes to submit to inspection. 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1988).
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to enforce its regulations via court actions,81 other statutes give the
EPA power to sanction violators through purely administrative actions. 82 The administrative sanctions include both revocation of operating licenses previously issued by the EPA and the assessment of
civil, monetary penalties. 83
Not all agencies, however, have been empowered to perform all
three traditional functions. Congress has given some agencies the
power to promulgate and enforce substantive standards, but not the
power to adjudicate those enforcement efforts.84 Agencies may also
have enforcement authority, but not the power to set substantive
standards. 85 Many different arrangements exist.
Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court illustrate how an
agency's entitlement to Chevron deference depends on these principles. In Adams Fruit Co. v. Barretf>6 the Court reviewed the Department of Labor's interpretation of the Agricultural Worker Protection
Act ("AWPA").87 The AWPA required the Secretary of Labor to
prescribe, via regulation, minimum standards for employers who
transport agricultural workers in motor vehicles. 88 In addition, Section 1854 of the AWPA gave aggrieved workers a right to sue privately for actual and statutory damages. 89 The respondents in Adams
Fruit were "migrant farmworkers employed by petitioner Adams
Fruit [Co.]" who "suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident
81 See The EPA at 36.
82 E.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1988); Toxic
Substances Control Act, § 16(a) (2) (A); Federal Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq.
(1988). See National Research Council Study at 137-40.
83 The enforcement and adjudication functions of the EPA under the Federal Pesticide Control
Act ("FEPCA"), were described in 1977 as follows:
FEPCA provides for a product registration process to control the sale, labeling, and shipment of pesticides, and
it allows the EPA to restrict certain uses of hazardous pesticides. For violations of these provisions, the Ad·
ministrator may assess civil penalties. The enforcement process requires that the alleged violator be given an
opportunity to have a hearing, although, in practice, a conference between the alleged violator and EPA has
usually resulted in a settlement. In those cases in which a hearing is requested by the alleged violator, a full
adjudicatory process is begun, and the results are ultimately reviewable by federal appellate courts.

National Research Council Study at 138.
84 See generally Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative
Agency Structure, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 965 (1991).
85 See Sunstein, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 2093. The EEOC, for example, has enforcement powers
with regard to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, but no power to promulgate
substantive rules or regulations in that area. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 14046 (1976).
86 _ _ U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 1384 (1990).
8796 Stat. 2583 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1982 & Supp. V».
8829 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982). The Secretary's regulations appear at 29 C.F.R. § 500 (1989).
8929 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982).
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while they traveled to work in Adams Fruit's van. "90 They had sued
under Section 1854 for damages.
The employer defended on the basis of a regulation that the
Secretary of Labor had promulgated. That regulation, Section
500. 122(b),91 stated that "[w]here a State worker's compensation law
is applicable and coverage is provided for a migrant or seasonal
agricultural worker by the employer, the worker's compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for loss under this Act . . . " The
employer indeed had provided coverage under a state worker's compensation law. Under the terms of the regulation, then, the workers
had no remedy under the AWPA.
The Court expressly rejected the employer's assertion that the
Secretary's regulation was entitled to Chevron deference. 92 In so doing,
it emphasized that both the enforcement of the AWPA's motor vehicle
standards and the adjudication of those enforcement efforts were outside the scope of the Secretary's duties.
[W]e need not defer to the Secretary's view of the scope of § 1854 because Congress has expressly established the Judiciary, and not the Department of Labor as
the adjudicator of private rights of action arising under the statute. 93
Congress established an enforcement scheme independent of the Executive and
provided ... direct recourse to federal court ... Under such circumstances, it
would be inappropriate to consult executive interpretations of § 1854 to resolve
ambiguities surrounding the scope of AWPA's judicially enforceable remedy.94

In light of these limitations on the agency's role the Secretary's expressed preference for a particular interpretation of § 1854 made no
difference. 95 On this basis, the Court ruled in favor of the injured
farmworkers.
In Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 96
the Court provided a fuller discussion of how agency functions affect
agency expertise, but in a somewhat different context. In Martin the
Court reviewed an agency interpretation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act ("OSH Act").97 Congress had given the Secretary
of Labor authority to promulgate standards and police violations un90 110 S.C!. at 1386.
91 29 C.F.R. § 500.122(b) (1989).
92 110 S.Ct. at 1390-91.
93 110 S.Ct. at 1390.
94 ld. at 1391.
95ld.
96 _
U.S.
,111 S.Ct. 1171 (1991).
97 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.).
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der the OSH Act. It had given adjudicatory authority, however, to
an independent agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission ("Commission").98 In the case under review the two
were unable to agree on the proper interpretation of a regulation the
Secretary had promulgated.
The various circuit courts of appeal had split evenly over whether
the Commission or the Secretary was entitled to deference in such
situations. 99 Some courts had concluded that the Secretary, as promulgator of the regulations, should be given the power interpret them.
Other courts, however, considered the power to interpret provisions
to be part of the normal powers of adjudication. Courts adhering to
this latter view deferred to the Commission. 100
The precise issue before the Court in Martin was thus the proper
interpretation of a regulation and not a statute. The Court nevertheless
found the issues to turn on the same considerations.
[W]e presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a
component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers. IOI

For that reason the Court characterized the question before it as determining "to which administrative actor-the Secretary or the Commission-did Congress delegate this 'interpretive' lawmaking power
under the OSH Act. "102
The Court decided that congress had given this power to the
Secretary and not the Commission. "The Secretary," it observed,
"enjoys readily identifiable structural advantages over the Commission. in rendering authoritative interpretations of the OSH Act regulations. "103 Significantly, the Court discussed all of these structural
98111 S. Ct. at 1174.
99 Compare, e.g., Brock v. Williams Enterprises of Georgia, Inc., 832 F.2d 567, 569-70
(11th Cir. 1987) (deference to Secretary); United Steelworkers of America v. Schuykill Metals
Corp., 828 F.2d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Donovan v. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d
at 65-66 (same) (collecting authorities), with Brock v. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 828 F.2d 373,
376 n.4 (6th Cir. 1987) (deference to Commission); Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp., 803 F.2d
999, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Marshall v. Western Electric, Inc., 565 F.2d 240, 244 (2d
Cir. 1977) (same).
100 E.g., Dole v. Dcc. Saf. & Health Reg. Comm., 891 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1989). Farina
describes such interpretory powers as a "quintessential judicial function." Farina, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. at 452. Cf., e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is. ").
101111 S. Ct. at 1176 (citations and footnote omitted).
1021d.
103 Id. at 1176.
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advantages in terms of the traditional functions of agencies. The
Secretary, it noted, has the rule making authority under the act, thus,
is more likely to know the actual purpose of the regulation in question. Additionally, the Secretary has enforcement authority and therefore comes into contact with a large number of regulatory problems.
The Commission, in contrast, has only adjudicatory authority. It
therefore "encounters only those regulatory episodes resulting in contested citations,"104 which the Court assumed to be comparatively
fewer in number. 105
"Consequently," the Court concluded, "the Secretary is more
likely to develop the expertise relevant to assessing the effect of a
regulatory interpretation. "106 The Court "presume[d]" that Congress
intended to invest interpretive power in the administrative actor who
was in the best position to develop that expertise. On that basis, it
chose the Secretary over the Commission. l07
Adams Fruit and Martin thus provide insight into when an agency's statutory interpretations qualify for Chevron deference. l08 The
judiciary defers to agencies under Chevron because it assumes that
the typical unitary agency knows better the history of the statute and
the relevant poliCies. A non-unitary agency, however, performs fewer
functions with regard to the statute. Its role may be so limited that
another entity performs more significant functions and thus has greater
lawmaking expertise. In such a situation the underlying premise of
Chevron does not apply with regard to the non-unitary agency. As
was the case in Martin the other, more expert entity may be a second
agency. If so, the interpretations of that second agency are to be
given preference. Alternatively, the judiciary may perform enough
l04ld. at 1177.
105 The foregoing discussion appears ill. at 1176-77.
1061d. at 1177.
1071d.
108 Another relevant decision of the Supreme Court in this area is EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., _ _ U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991), in which the Court addressed the controlling effect of an interpretation of Title VII by the EEOC. There, the Court subjected the
EEOC's interpretation to the more searching standard of review that existed before Chevron. 111
S.Ct. at 1235 (applying standard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. at 140). It did so because
" 'Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules
or regulations.' " Id. (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141).
Although the majority opinion in Aramco does not cite Chevron it clearly addresses whether
Chevron should apply to interpretations of the EEOC. Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, specifically criticizes the majority for its failure to provide the EEOC Chevron deference. Id. at 123637.
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functions so that it is more expert. In this latter situation Chevron
deference does not exist at all. 109
B. The PTO's Entitlement to Chevron Deference
1. The PTO's role in the statutory scheme

The criteria identified in the preceding section are particularly
destructive to the PTO's claim of expertise. The American patent
system assumes that granting inventors monopoly-like rights for limited periods of time will speed the pace of innovation. 110 The statutory
scheme acts on this assumption by bestowing such rights on the
inventor in exchange for the disclosure of an invention that meets
certain specified criteria. 111
Unfortunately for the PTO's claim of expertise, the PTO performs none of the three traditional agency functions within this statutory scheme. Adjudication in the U.S. patent system occurs before
the courts. The remedy for patent infringement is currently via a civil
action under 35 U.S.c. § 281, and not through any proceeding before
the PTO.112 The courts, in fact, have always adjudicated patent infringement in civil actions; 113 adjudication has never taken place before the PTO.114
Neither does the PTO have any enforcement role under the present statutory scheme. A patent owner seeking to vindicate its patent
rights against a violator must itself bring an action for infringement.
The PTO has no authority to sue for infringement on behalf of the
109 See e.g., Anthony, 7 Yale J. on Reg. at 47 ("A purely adjudicative agency, holding no
rulemaking or other policymaking powers, 'is not entitled to any special deference from the courts'
for its interpretations." (quoting Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Worker's
Compensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 278 n.18 (1980) (citing authorities)); Sunstein, 90 Colum.
L. Rev. at 2093, 2096 (agencies with enforcement, but no rulemaking powers do not have
"pedigree" sufficient for deference under Chevron; "The line between independent review and
Chevron's deference ... should tum directly on questions of relative competence. ").
110 E.g., In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 182 (CCPA 1957); Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J. Law & Econ. 265, 266-67 (1977) (surveying literature). See generally,
e.g., Malchup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Patent Study No. 15; Abramson, The
Patent System: Its Economic and Social Basis, Patent Study No. 26, at 4-7.
111 35 U.S.C. § 154. See e.g., Patent Study No. 26 at 7. The criteria are, of course, the wellknown requirements of statutory subject matter, novelty, non-obviousness, adequate disclosure,
and sufficiently definite description. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-{)3, 112, ~~ 1-2.
112 "A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent." 35 U.S.C.
§ 281.
113 See e.g., Patent Act of 1790, § 4, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (providing damages "in an

action on the case").
114 The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, for example, which created the Patent Office,
nonetheless maintained the remedy of infringement via a civil action. Id. at § 17.
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patentee; 115 indeed, the present PTO is totally unequipped to police
patent infringements even if it were to be given that role. 116 This
feature of the American patent system also has been unchanged during
the entire history of the PTO.l17
Congress has also deprived the PTO of the third traditional function of federal agencies-that of rulemaking. Congress' rulemaking
delegation to the PTO is narrowly worded. The PTO has been authorized only to "establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office."118
The delegation is consistent with a congressional intent to confer only
the power to make non-binding rules of internal management.1l9 It
apparently does not confer on the PTO any substantive rulemaking
powers. 120
To be sure, the patent statute does assign to the PTO the job of
performing some adjudications with regard to patents. The PTO has
been directed to "superintend or perform all duties required by law
respecting the granting and issuing of patents."121 This consists primarily Of determining whether individual applications for patents are
115 35 U.S.C. § 281, supra, note 112.
116 Compare, for example, the current structure of the PTO with the elaborate inspection and
enforcement mechanisms of the EPA, supra at notes 78--85.
117 See, e.g., Section 14 of the Patent Act of 1836 (referring to the patent owner as "plaintifr'
in suit for infringement).
11835 U.S.C. § 6 ("The Commissioner ... may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce, establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the
Patent and Trademark Office. ").
119 Cf., e.g., Congress' delegations to the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Pub. L. No.
93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974), and the EEOC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a). Both exclude from the
agency power to make substantive rules. See, e.g., The Effect of New Rule 56, 74 JPTOS at 268
n.59 (discussing the Privacy Protection Study Commission), and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141 & n.20 (1976) (discussing the EEOC).
The legislative history of Congress' original delegation to the PTO supports this position as
well. See the comments of Congressman Jenckes, reprinted in Congressional Globe, 41st Cong.,
2d Sess., 2855-56 (April 20, 1870) ("It is part of the recommendation of the committee ...
that the power which the Commissioner shall have and ought to have shall be that of regulating
the manner in which the proceedings shall be conducted in his Office; the rules of court, so to
speak, not the rules of decision but of government." (emphasis added». See The Effect of New
Rule 56, 74 JPTOS at 269 n.60.
120 The Effect of New Rule 56,74 JPTOS at 266-269. See Tai, Substantive Versus Interpretive
Rulemaking in the United States Patent and Trademark Office: The Federal Circuit Animal Legal
Defense Fund Decision, 32 Idea 235, 237, 247 (1992).
This limitation on the Commissioner's rulemaking authority has apparently existed since a very
early date. See Stephens v. Salisbury, MacArthur's Pat. Cas. 379, 384 (C.C.D.C. 1855) ("The
appellant has referred to the seventh rule of the Patent Office .... [I]t is proper to say that the
acts of Congress on the subject must always be looked to, and whatever principle is not comprehended in their provisions is not to be depended on. ").
121 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
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allowable in ex parte proceedings before the Examining Corps and
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 122 In addition, the
PTO determines priority of invention when two inventors simultaneously attempt to claim interfering subject matter. 123 All these determinations qualify as adjudications. 124
The statutory scheme, however, gives unusually little credence
to these administrative determinations of the PTO. An inventor who
has received an adverse ruling from the PTO during ex parte examination can either appeal immediately to the Federal Circuit125 or file
a civil action against the PTO in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 126 While the record before the Federal Circuit is closed, the record before the district court is open, i.e., the
applicant is free to introduce evidence beyond what was before the
PTO during prosecution. 127 Under either review mechanism the PTO's
factual determinations are overturned on clear error. 128 The same
general mechanisms are used to review the PTO's determinations of
priority of invention. 129
122 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 134.
12335 U.S.C. § 135.
124 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Cf.
Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting demand
to depose examiner because of examiner's "quasi-judicial" function).
125 35 U.S.C. § 141. Review of PTO decisions in a parte applications was originally by
appeal to an outside board of examiners appointed by the Secretary of State. Patent Act of 1836
at §7. Each board was apparently assembled ad hoc as the need arose in connection with individual
patent applications. See Report from the Commissioner of Patents, H.R. Doc. No. 80, 25th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1839). It appears that no such appeals took place under this provision until 1838. See
generally Federico, The Patent Offtee in 1839, 21 JPOS 786, 791 (1939). Judicial review of a
parte decisions of the PTO began with the Patent Act of 1839, § 11, ch. 88, 5 Stat. 353-55. See
MacArthur, Patent Cases, at v (1885).
Legislative histories show that Congress provided for independent review of the PTO out of
distrust of PTO. "The board of examiners [under the Patent Act of 1836] ... was provided, it
is presumed, to relieve the apprehen8ions some might have entertained, from the power necessarily
conferred, and the duty imposed upon the Commissioner, to withhold a patent . . . . " 1839
Report from the Commissioner of Patents. Accord S. Rep. No. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952) (accompanying Patent Act of 1952) ("The Act of 1836 provided, for the first time, for
the refusal of patents by officials known as examiners. The legislature was jealous of the rights
of the public and provided adequate means of reviewing the action of the Patent Office. ").
126 35 U.S.C. § 145.
127 E.g., Hirschfeld v. Banner, 462 F. Supp. ·135, 141 (D.C.D.C. 1978).
128 E.g., Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Sikora v. Brenner, 259
F.2d 431 (D.C.D.C. 1966).
129 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 146.
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After issuance, moreover, the courts completely revisit the PTO's
determinations of patentability yet again.130 An accused infringer can
defend against liability on the ground of invalidity.l31 The defense
has always been available 132 and is nearly always pled. It opens all
the issues upon which the PTO ruled when determining patentability133
and the determination is again made on a completely open factual
record.134 The PTO's resolution of factual questions is not controlling
if clear and convincing evidence is to the contrary. 135
Court review of the PTO's patentability determinations is therefore much closer to de novo than is judicial review of the determinations of other agencies. Courts typically review the adjudications
of agencies on a record that is closed, not open.136 The factual determinations of a typical agency are overturned only if they are unsupported by substantial evidence137- a showing that is more deferential
to the agency than the standards applied to the PTO. 138
More fundamentally, the patent statute has given the PTO a role
that is extremely limited in nature when compared to the patent sys-

130 See, e.g., the following quotation from In re Thompson, 26 App. D.C. 419, 425 (1906)
(citations omitted):
No absolute right of property is conferred by the grant of the patent. The patentee is merely put in a position
to assert his prima facie right against infringers who may in their defense, raise the question of the validity of
the patent, and have the same finally adjudicated in the light of a full presentation and consideration of all the
evidence attainable in respect of anticipation, prior knowledge, use, and the like.

The PTO has cited this language in Thompson with approval in Patent Office, Court Decisions
as Guides to Patent Office Policy and Performance, Patent Study No. 25, at 2-3 (1960). Cf.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 394 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) ("A patent, in the last analysis, simply represents
a legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office. ").
131 35 U.S.C. § 282.
132 Section 15 of the Patent Act of 1836 allowed the defendant in an infringement case to
"plead the general issue," including invalidity on any ground sufficient to bar issuance of the
patent.
133 Invalidity may be asserted "on any ground specified in this title as a condition for patentability." 35 U.S.C. § 282.
134 There has arisen, in fact, a spirited debate as to how such newly presented evidence in
validity proceedings should affect the presumption that an issued patent is valid. The Federal
Circuit currently requires facts offered to establish invalidity to be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. E.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1358-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
135Id.
136 E.g., Conax Florida Corp. v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 408, 411 (D.C.D.C. 1986)
("The general rule remains that the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative
record already in existence, not some new record completed initially in the reviewing court."
(citing authorities».
137 See, e.g., Akzo v. USITC, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986); United States v. ICC,
221 F. Supp. 584, 587 (D.C.D.C. 1963).
138 See generally 5 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 29.5.
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tern as a whole. 139 The PTO's issuance of a patent gives the patent
owner in essence only a tentative license to sue for infringement.
Under the statute, the courts can revoke that license as part of adjudicating any dispute over the infringement of the patent. 140
In performing its limited functions, moreover, the PTO routinely
fails to come into contact with vast areas of the patent system. 141 It
is obviously uninvolved, for example, with questions of infringement
and damages. 142 Less obviously, it also seldom confronts certain classes
of issues within the field of patentability. 143
The PTO's functions are thus very limited when viewed in the
context of the overall statutory scheme of patent law. In point of fact,
the PTO is so structurally isolated within that statutory scheme as to
139 See, e.g., Weber, The Patent Office, 32 (1924) ("[I]t is not within the province of the
Patent Office to administer the laws pertaining to the rights of patentees or the public after the
patents are issued .... ").
140 E.g., Patent Study No. 25, at 2-3, 7; In re Crawford, 154 F.2d 670 (CCPA 1946)(Bland,
J., concurring) ("Patents are only prima facie evidence of invention and, as has been true for
more than one hundred years, the equity courts, generally speaking, may be trusted, upon more
complete records, to correct any mistakes made by the Patent Office in granting patents. ").
141 Professor Dreyfuss has discussed this in connection with the Federal Circuit's effect on
the substantive law of patents:
Previous [to the creation of the Federal Circuit). the PTa and the CCPA made most patentability determinations.
while the regional courts handled enforcement issues. This bifurcation of technical and remedial questions made
it unlikely that any court would consider patent law in the aggregate.
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 21

(1989) (hereinafter "Dreyfuss"). See also id. at 13, 66-67; Strawbridge, McDonald & Moy,
Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During
1986, 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 861, 878-79 (1987).
142 E.g., Dreyfuss, 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 13. The point would appear to be inarguably settled
in light of the statutory scheme.
143 These include, for example, issues involving public-use and on-sale activities. See Green
v. Rich Iron Co., 944 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (criticizing district court characterization of PTO
as having "special expertise" in "questions of public use and sale").
The PTO's search files consist almost exclusively of printed publications, particularly in the
form of U.S. and foreign patent documents. Under the patent statute, however, prior art can
include information that is "known or used" or "in public use or on sale." 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(b). Prior art in these latter categories often includes information that is not in the form of printed
publications. E.g., Patent Study No. 25, at 1 n.2 ("The Patent Office obviously does not have
available in the form of printed publications or patents all evidence of actual prior use or knowledge."). See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (limiting requests for reexamination to those based on
"prior art consisting of patents or printed publications"). To this extent, then, the PTO's information on patentability is systematically incomplete.
The PTO has no power to independently search for prior-art information in these latter categories. It relies instead solely on voluntary submissions of such information by the inventor. See,
e.g., 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56, 1.97-99. It has no means of verifying whether any inventor has in fact
disclosed the information sufficiently. See infra, note 146.
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call its lawmaking expertise into question. l44 Certainly this question
extends to claims that the PTO is expert in matters wholly outside
the PTO's jurisdiction, such as infringement and damages. In addition, however, many aspects of infringement and damages are closely
related to those of patentability and validity. 145 The PTO's claims of
expertise are therefore suspect even when they concern the PTO's
core functions.
This lack of expertise should manifest itself in the PTO's legal
positions directly. Since the PTO has little background in infringement matters, for example, it should be unconcerned with, and to
some degree uneducated as to how its statutory interpretations will
affect infringement determinations. An inexpert PTO thus will undervalue the costs that its interpretations impose in that area. At the
same time, the PTO's statutory preoccupation with patentability matters should cause it to overvalue the benefits that its interpretations
will bestow on its own operations. In short, an inexpert PTO will
take positions on the law that are systematically flawed.
The PTO's positions on at least one current issue, that involving
the scope of means expression during ex parte prosecution, show
144 See Dreyfuss, 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 67 (arguing that administration of the patent law under
the CCPA and the PTO was "piecemeal"; the CCPA's review solely of the PTO, and not
infringement suits, did not give either lawmaking body "the motivation to knit doctrinal strands
together"). Professor Dreyfuss also argues that the PTO's determinations are suspect because of
the one-sided nature of a parte proceedings. Id. at 66-67.
145 Claim interpretation, for example, is an issue in infringement, patentability and validity
determinations. E.g., SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878
n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (observing that consistent claim interpretation between infringement and
validity is "axiomatic"). See generally Wepner, The Patent Invalidity/Infringement Parallel:
Symmetry or Semantics?, 93 Dick. L. Rev. 67 (1988). Other relationships exist as well. The
determinations of validity and infringement, in fact, may be so interwoven as to render the
submission of the issues to separate triers of fact constitutionally impermissible. Cf. Gasoline
Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1931); 9 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2391 (1971); 5 Moore's Federal Practice, § 42.03[2] (2d ed.
1991).
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these systematic flaws. l46 By way of background, the patent statute
authorizes the use of means expressions in the sixth paragraph of
Section 112.147 That provision states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or a step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.

The Federal Circuit has held that the provision requires means expressions to be interpreted during prosecution the same as during infringement determinations. 148 The PTO, however, disagrees. 149
According to the PTO means expressions should be read more broadly
during prosecution, to encompass all elements that are capable of
performing the recited function. 150 It has asserted in a recent Explanatory Notice that its own interpretation of the statutory provision
should be controlling. 151
The PTO's arguments regarding this statutory provision typify
those of an agency with limited perspective. The statutory interpretation that the PTO seeks to defend causes one invention to be judged
146 See supra, note 2.
These concerns also cast doubt on the usefulness of the PTO's recent foray via rulernaking into
the proper extent of a patent applicant's "duty to disclose" information to the PTO during
prosecution. See, e.g., PTO Notice Regarding Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021. See
generally also Lee, USPTO Proposals to Change Rule 56 and the Related Rules Regarding a
Patent Applicant's Duty of Candor, Patent World, Feb. 1992, at 32. The degree to which a patent
applicant has in fact misled the PTO almost never becomes known until the issue is subject to
discovery during litigation before the courts. As already stated, however, the PTO is not involved
in enforcing patent rights. Published court decisions on the issue of inequitable conduct thus are
the only systematic means by which the PTO learns that a patent applicant has violated the duty
to disclose. The sufficiency of this mechanism in educating the PTO is highly suspect. Only a
very small fraction of all issued patents are litigated to published decision in the courts. See Patent
Study No. 29 at 36-38 (reporting district court and regional circuit decisions on patents as
involving under 1% of issued patents; "The validity of the vast majority of the patents issued by
the Patent Office has never been tested in the courts. "). The PTO may therefore have no real
idea whether the typical patent applicant discloses information adequately during examination, or
even whether the applicant's disclosure is in accordance with the PTO's statement of the duty.
147 35 U.S.C. § 112, , 6. The provision originally appeared as the third paragraph of this
section. Three paragraphs were later inserted into the paragraph by amendment. See Act of Nov.
14, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-131, § 7, 1975 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News (89 Stat.) 685.
148 E.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
149 PTO Notice Regarding Section 112, 41 PTCJ at 411-12 (stating decision not to follow
Bond); PTO Explanatory Notice, 43 PTCJ at 161, 164.
150 PTO Notice Regarding Section 112, 41 PTCJ at 411-12. See generally Moy, The Interpretation of Means Expressions During Examination, 68 JPOS 246 (June 1986) (hereinafter
"Means Expressions").
151 PTO Explanatory Notice, 43 PTCJ at 164.
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for patentability, and another, different invention to be used to determine infringement. 152 This discontinuity strikes at basic assumptions of the patent system. 153 The PTO determines the patentability
of a broad invention, moreover, when it is clear that only a narrow
invention would be used to determine infringement-a situation that
is virtually guaranteed to prevent meritorious inventions from obtaining patent protection. 154 The PTO's Explanatory Notice, however,
does not mention this problem. Instead, it dwells at length on the
relationship of the PTO's interpretation to the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents,155 a legal rule that has been applied in infringement
litigations only on extremely rare occasions. 156 The PTO's primary
policy concerns rest mainly on the negative impact the PTO fears the
Federal Circuit's interpretation will have on the PTO's workload. 157
2. The PTO's historical familiarity with the patent statute.

There are also strong reasons why the question of historical
familiarity should work against the PTO's claim to Chevron deference. An agency's "institutional memory" of the original purpose
and meaning of a provision is a "practical administrative consideration" in deciding whether to defer to the agency's interpretation. ISS
Many of the statutory provisions relating to patent law, however, are
so ancient that the PTO is factually unlikely to possess any significant
institutional memory regarding them. The original patent statute in
152 See, e.g., Means Expressions, 68 JPOS at 266-68.
153 See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics, 859 F.2d at n.7 (use of same claim interpretation
between validity and infringement "axiomatic").
154 Means Expressions, 68 JPOS at 268.
155 43 PTCJ at 166.
156 See SRI International v. Matsushita, 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Ethyl
Molded Products Co. v. Betts Package, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1001, 1026 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (observing
that the Federal Circuit has never applied the reverse doctrine of equivalents); Merges and Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Claim Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 864 n.113 (1990). The
doctrine has controlled the outcome of only one reported decision since 1982. Precision Metal
Fabricators Inc. v. Jetstream Systems Co., 693 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Calif. 1988).
157 PTO Explanatory Notice, 43 PTCJ at 166-67:
3. Policy Considerations
a.

PTO Workload

PTO's workload will increase; without the benefit of live testimony and testing facilities, the PTO will have to
resolve structural equivalency.

b. Practical Application
[l)t would be impractical for the PTO to attempt to apply the last clause of §
comparing prior art to claims in ex parte examination.

112'8 final

paragraph when

158 E.g., Donovan v. Amorello, 761 F.2d at 66. See Martin, 111 S.Ct. at 1176.
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the United States was promulgated in the 18th century.159 Congress
created the modern examination system, along with the PTO, in 1836. 160
Many modern statutory provisions in the U.S. patent law codify or
repeat legal rules that were developed in the 19th century. Even the
latest recodification of the Patent Laws is now almost forty years
01d. 161
More importantly, the Federal Circuit is itself likely to be very
familiar with the history of the patent statutes. The Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO.162 All the experience of the judiciary in such matters is therefore concentrated in
a single court. Appeals from the PTO, moreover, are routine and
statistically commonplace, a condition which should further enhance
the familiarity of the Federal Circuit with the merits of the PTO's
legal determinations. 163
In fact, the Federal Circuit is much more expert in the relation
to the PTO than is, say, the D.C. Circuit in relation to the EPA.
Congress created the Federal Circuit specifically to consolidate into
a single court all appeals in all patent cases, including those from
infringement actions before the district courts. 164 Judges of the Fed159 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12.
160 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357,5 Stat". 117.
161 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792.
162 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (1988).
163 Another, related factor evidencing the Federal Circuit's expertise is the fact that a significant
number of the judges on that court have specialized in the law of patents prior to being appointed
to the judiciary. The effect of the patent-spechilist judges on the formation of substantive patent
law has been explored in the context of the histOlY of the CCPA. Baum, Judicial Specialization,
Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 L. &
Soc'y. Rev. 823 (1977).
The presence of these patent specialists on the Federal Circuit can be traced to two influences.
First, the patent bar has a particular interest in increasing the number of patent specialists among
the judges of that court. Second, Congress itself recognized, in creating the Federal Circuit, that
the Federal Circuit's lawmaking expertise in the patent area could be strengthened through the
appointment of patent specialists to a portion of the court. See H. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16 (1981) (noting, in reference to 28 U.S.C. § 46(a), that judges of the Federal Circuit will
have "patent law expertise").
The presence of these patent specialists on the Federal Circuit can result in the PTO's claim
to deference appearing peculiar in individual cases. For example, the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, whose interpretation is a matter of current disagreement between the PTO and the Federal
Circuit, supra, notes 146-57, first appeared in the Patent Act of 1952. The only surviving coauthor of that act is Judge Giles Rich of the Federal Circuit, see Congressional Intent, supra,
note 61, who authored one of the opinions the PTO is refusing to accept. In re Iwahashi, 888
F.2d 1370.
164 E.g., S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7, 21, reprinted at 1982 U.S. Code Congo
& Ad. New 11, 15-17, 31; H.R. Rep. No. 97-312 at 6-9. See generally Lever, Jr., The New
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Part I), 64 JPOS 178, 197-208 (1982).
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eral Circuit therefore encounter issues of patent law repeatedly, with
a frequency far outstripping the D.C. Circuit's encounters with the
EPA's governing acts.165 The Federal Circuit may thus have a historical familiarity with the patent laws that rivals or even exceeds
that of the PTO.
Congress' very creation of the Federal Circuit, in fact, strikes
at the heart of the assumptions that underlie Chevron. Congress took
the unusual step of consolidating all patent appeals into the Federal .
Circuit for the purpose of providing that court with overall doctrinal
responsibility for the law of patents. 166 One underlying premise was
that placing all patent cases before a single court would increase the
expertise of that body and cause it to create higher quality legal
rules. 167 Chevron, on the other hand, is based on the opposite premise: that Congress intends agencies, and not the courts, to have primary lawmaking responsibilities. 168 If this assumption concerning
Congress' intent is factually incorrect in a particular setting then
Chevron should not apply.169 The simple presence of the Federal
Circuit makes such an assumption particularly likely to be incorrect
in the case of the Federal Circuit's review of the PTOYo
C. Analysis and Prior Precedents

The PTO thus performs too few of the traditional functions of
agencies to qualify for the deference described in Chevron. Compared
to the Federal Circuit, it is isolated within the patent system and
therefore unable to obtain a broad range of information and experi165 For example, the EPA was named as a party before the D.C> Circuit in 23 reported cases
during 1989-90. During that same period the Federal Circuit acted upon 201 appeals from patent
proceedings in the PTO. Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (1989,
1990).
166 E.g., S. Rep. No. 97-275,1982 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News at 15-17.
1671d.
168 See supra, notes 30-32.
169 See Sunstein, 1990 Duke L.J. at 2091 ("Chevron is inapplicable when the particular context
suggests that deference would be a poor reconstruction of congressional desires. ").
170 Other evidence supports this conclusion as well. The PTO is one of the oldest federal
agencies. See Litan & Nordhaus, Refonning Federal Regulation, 44-46 (1983) (asserting that first
federal regulatory agency was created in 1837); Asimow, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 759 (asserting that
only 5 federal regulatory agencies existed in 1900). At the time Congress created the PTO full
judicial review of agency decisions was considered "axiomatic." Sunstein, 1990 Duke L.J. at
2085. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to place lawmaking power in the hands
of the PTO, over the courts, when it created the PTO.
In addition, Congress has characterized itself as originally having been distrustful of the PTO's
decisionmaking powers. See supra, note 125.
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ence. This should directly reduce the quality of the PTO's lawmaking
expertise to the level where Chevron does not apply.
Comparing the PTO's situation with that of the Secretary of
Labor in Martin l7l illustrates the magnitude of this problem for the
PTO. In Martin the Secretary lacked only the power to adjudicate;
retaining both the power to make substantive rules and the power to
enforce those rules against violators. in This single gap in the Secretary's power nevertheless created a close question whether the Secretary or the Commission had the greater lawmaking expertise. 173
Congress has given the PTO, in contrast, far fewer powers than the
Secretary. The PTO, like the Secretary in Martin, has essentially no
adjudicatory powers with regard to the statutory scheme as a whole.
In addition, however, the PTO has no enforcement powers. Its substantive rule making powers extend at best only to those matters that
concern "the conduct of proceedings in the PTO," and even then
only to matters that are "not inconsistent with law. "174 The PTO's
lawmaking expertise as a result should be far less than that of the
Secretary.
The courts, on the other hand, occupy a position within the
patent system that is roughly comparable to that of the Commission
in Martin: both perform the adjudicatory function. What was a difficult question in Martin should therefore be an easier question when
applied to the PTO. The PTO is less expert than the courts. It is
consequently not entitled to Chevron deference.
While this conclusion may seem striking at first, it is actually
consistent with precedents of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
specifically considered the degree to which courts should defer to the
statutory interpretations of the PTO on two occasions in the late 19th
century.175 Because these cases predate the rise of the modern administrative state they do not bear on the PTO's present lawmaking
powers directly. Nevertheless, the cases are striking. In both the
Court focused on the limited functions of the PTO within the patent
system as a whole-the very aspect of the PTO that remains relevant
today under Chevron. In both cases the Court rejected any rigid rule
of judicial deference to the PTO.
171 See supra notes 96-107.
172 111 S.Ct. at 1174.
173 See the cases collected supra, at note 99.
17435 U.S.C. § 6. See the discussion supra, at notes 118-120.
175 Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 717-8 (1888); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger,
157 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1895).
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The first case, Andrews v. Hovey, centered around an earlier
version of the statutory-bar provision that is now in 35 U.S.C. §
102(b).176 At issue was whether prefiling activities performed without
the knowledge, consent, or allowance of the patent applicant could
establish a bar to patentability.177 In a first decision in the case, 178
the Court had decided that such activities could bar patentability.
The losing party then sought rehearing on the basis of additional
"views and authorities," 179 including the official position of the PTO.
Specifically, the PTO had interpreted the statutory provision at issue
differently than the Court in a rule that purported to govern practice
during ex parte prosecution. 180 At the time of the rehearing the particular statutory provision was over 15 years 01d,181 and the PTO's
interpretation of its was long-standing. 182 According to the petitioner,
the PTO's prior interpretation of the provision should have settled
the question. Alternatively, the petitioner argued, the Court should
have deferred to the PTO's viewpoint. 183
The Court found neither argument persuasive. It first addressed
the binding effect of the PTO's rule. "[T]he promulgation and enforcement of such a rule" by the PTO, it stated, "cannot be regarded
as having the effect of a judicial or authoritative adjudication of the
question under consideration. "184 Later in its opinion, the Court addressed whether the PTO's interpretation was entitled to any other
special weight. The Court decided it was not, in language that is
strikingly similar to the limitation on Chevron deference under discussion in this article:
Nor is this a case for the application of the doctrine that, in cases of ambiguity,
the practice adopted by an executive department of the government in interpreting
and administering a statute is to be taken as some evidence of its proper construc176 Act of 1839, ch. 88, 5 Stal. 354 (1850) (codified as amended at R.S. § 4886 (1875».
177 124 U.S. at 701.
178 123 U.S. 267.
179 124 U.S. at 701. Interestingly, the losing party in Andrews v. Hovey is reported to have
been supported by briefs from both George Ticknor Curtis and Albert H. Walker. ld. at 700.
Curtis was the author of A Treatise on the Law of Patents, a work which appeared in four editions
from 1849·73 and which was influential in the early development of U.S. patent law. Walker
was of course the author of Text·Book of the Patent Laws, (1883).
180 E.g., 124 U.S. at 702 ("It is also urged, that the court omitted to give due weight to what
is said to be the current executive and judicial authority in favor of the construction upon which
the appellants rely. ").
181 The provision at issue was part of the Patent Act of 1870.
182 See 124 U.S. at 716.
183 ld. at 716·18.
184 ld. at 716.
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tion. The question before us ... is not a question of executive administration, but
is properly a judicial question. Although it may be a question which, to some
extent, may come under the cognizance of the commissioner of patents, in granting
a patent, yet like all the questions passed upon by him in granting a patent . . . his
determination thereof, in granting a particular patent, has never been looked upon
as concluding the determination of the courts in regard to those questions, respecting such particular patent, and a fortiori respecting other patents. 185

On the basis the Court rejected the petition for rehearing and declined
to adopt the PTO's statutory interpretation.
Less than a decade later the Supreme Court addressed the issue
again in a second case, Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger. 186 That
case presented another appellant who sought a statutory construction
contrary to the longstanding view of the PTO.187 In ruling on the
question the Court reiterated its holding in Andrews v. Hovey. 188
"The appellant, therefore," it said, "properly insists that the determination of the present question shall not be deemed absolutely concluded ... by the practice that has obtained in the Patent Office. "189

III.

CONCLUSION

The courts retain their traditional freedom to reject the PTO's
statutory interpretations despite Chevron. The Supreme Court has
given Chevron deference only to agencies that administer statutory
schemes, and not to all agencies generally. The courts thus continued
to ha,:e their historic lawmaking authority over atypical, non-expert
agencIes.
The PTO is one such atypical, non-expert agency excluded from
the effects of Chevron. Congress has entrusted the PTO with few
administrative tasks. This, in turn, makes the PTO systematically
inexpert with regard to the patent law as whole. In addition, the
Federal Circuit possesses advantages over the typical court of appeals.
It is likely to be expert itself with regard to the patent laws, thereby
eroding the theoretical justification for Chevron deference in the case
of the PTO.
The PTO's current attempts to use Chevron as a means of obtaining greater influence over he patent law are therefore misguided.
185Id. at 717·18 (first emphasis added).
186 157 U.S. 1 (1895).
187 See ide at 26-30.
188 Id. at 33-34.
189 Id. at 34.
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Influence for the PTO will not result from the mere fact that the
PTO's statutory interpretations are those of a federal agency. Rather,
the PTO must rely for influence, as it always has, on the quality
inherent in its individual legal rulings.
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